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Notice
ANY TAX ADVICE IN THIS COMMUNICATION IS NOT
INTENDED OR WRITTEN BY KPMG TO BE USED, AND
CANNOT BE USED, BY A CLIENT OR ANY OTHER PERSON
OR ENTITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF (i) AVOIDING
PENALTIES THAT MAY BE IMPOSED ON ANY TAXPAYER
OR (ii) PROMOTING, MARKETING OR RECOMMENDING TO
ANOTHER PARTY ANY MATTERS ADDRESSED HEREIN.
You (and your employees, representatives, or agents) may disclose to any and all
persons, without limitation, the tax treatment or tax structure, or both, of any
transaction described in the associated materials we provide to you, including, but
not limited to, any tax opinions, memoranda, or other tax analyses contained in
those materials.
The information contained herein is of a general nature and based on authorities
that are subject to change. Applicability of the information to specific situations
should be determined through consultation with your tax adviser.
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Dated Material

THE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THESE COURSE MATERIALS
IS CURRENT AS OF THE DATE PRODUCED. THE MATERIALS
HAVE NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE UPDATED TO
INCORPORATE ANY TECHNICAL CHANGES TO THE
CONTENT OR TO REFLECT ANY MODIFICATIONS TO A TAX
SERVICE OFFERED SINCE THE PRODUCTION DATE. YOU
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFYING WHETHER OR NOT
THERE HAVE BEEN ANY TECHNICAL CHANGES SINCE THE
PRODUCTION DATE AND WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRM
STILL APPROVES ANY TAX SERVICES OFFERED FOR
PRESENTATION TO CLIENTS. YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH
WASHINGTON NATIONAL TAX AND RISK MANAGEMENTTAX AS PART OF YOUR DUE DILIGENCE.
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Agenda





The Post Election Lineup
The Fiscal Cliff
− Unsustainable budget deficits
Tax Reform--What Is/Was/Will Be on the Table?
What are the “Stakes”
− Individual
− Business
 Rate/Base
 International
 Pass-throughs/ C. Corps



Timing and Potential Outcomes
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The Election Outcome






President
Senate
− Democrats increase their majority—55 (including 2
Independents)- 45
House
− Republicans retain control

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Fiscal Cliff --Total Budget Deficit – Total Dollars
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Sources: CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook, fiscal years 2012 to 2022 (August 2012), Table 1.6;
CBO alternative fiscal scenario assumes extension of doc fix, increase in discretionary spending at the
rate of inflation, no enforcement of budget caps, extension of expiring tax provisions, and index AMT
for inflation, as well as the extra interest costs associated with each.
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Fiscal Cliff At The End of 2012










All 2001-2003 tax cuts expire
AMT “patch” expires
“Extenders” have expired
Payroll tax cut expires
Many unemployment benefits expire
“Doc fix” expires
Sequestration takes effect in FY13
Debt ceiling may be reached

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.

7

The Fiscal Cliff--Factors That Will Affect the Outcome


Fiscal situation is daunting
− Delicate balance between encouraging economic
recovery and controlling long-term deficit
 CBO projections illustrate dilemma
• Current law (expiration of tax cuts, failure to patch AMT, etc.)
results in slow short term economic growth, long term fiscal stability
» Short term GDP decline of .5%, unemployment at 9.1% through
4th Q. 2013, public debt at 58% of GDP in 2022
• Extension of tax cuts accelerates growth, creates unsustainable
long term deficits
» Short term GDP increase of 1.7%, unemployment at 8%
through 4th Q. 2013, public debt at 90% of GDP in 2022

Source: CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook; Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022 (August 2012)

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Fiscal Cliff--Factors that Will Affect the Outcome



Individual tax issue must be addressed
− Only significant difference between the parties is
whether tax rates increase on high income individuals
 Who are high income individuals
 What happens to dividend rates

− Fate of extenders
 Family and Business Tax Cut Act of 2012 reported by Senate
Finance Committee
•
•
•
•



Major “extenders” retroactively renewed through 2013
$205 billion revenue cost is not offset
Not likely to move as a separate bill
Bonus depreciation not extended

Sequestration must be addressed
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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What Is Was and Will Be on the Table?







President’s FY 13 Budget
− Individual
− Business/ The President’s Framework for Business Tax
Reform
The Path to Prosperity (House 2012 Budget
Resolution)
Camp/Enzi Corporate Rate Reduction/Territorial
Proposals
Fiscal Responsibility Commission (Simpson-Bowles)
Debt Reduction Task Force (Domenici-Rivlin)

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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President’s FY2013 Budget - Major Individual Proposals





Sunset Bush Tax Cuts for Those With Incomes in
Excess of $250,000
− Reinstate Pease and PEP
Limit value of itemized deductions to 28 percent
Restore 2009 wealth transfer tax parameters
− Require consistency in value for transfer and income
taxes
− Modify rules on valuation discounts
− Require a minimum term for GRATs
− Limit duration of GST exemption
− Coordinate income and transfer tax rules applicable to
grantor trusts
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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President’s FY13 Budget - Business Taxation

 The

President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform
− Has to be read in conjunction with the Budget
− Twenty-eight % marginal rate
 Effective rate of 25% for manufacturing income
 Retain and expand the R & E credit

− Rejection of pure territorial tax system for non-U.S.
income
 Imposition of minimum tax on foreign income

− Eliminate accelerated depreciation
− Limit corporate interest deductibility
− Expand scope of corporate tax
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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FY 2013 Budget - Major Domestic Business Tax
Proposals












Extend “expensing” for one year
Provide one year 10% credit for new jobs and wage increases
Provide a 20% tax credit for expenses attributable to insourcing a U.S.
trade or business
Disallow deductions for expenses attributable to outsourcing a U.S. trade
or business
Modify the section 199 manufacturing deduction
− Eliminate the deduction for fossil fuel production
− Increase deduction to 18% for “advanced technology property”
− Increase general deduction to achieve at tax rate of 25% on manufacturing
income
Expand and make R&E credit permanent
Extend certain expiring provisions through 2012
Repeal LIFO and LCM method of accounting for inventories
− Ten year transition for LIFO, 4 for LCM
Tax carried interests as ordinary income
Repeal oil and gas and coal (fossil-fuel) preferences

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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FY 2013 Budget - Major International Tax Proposals
 Minimum tax on foreign income
 Defer deduction of interest expense related to deferred
foreign-source income
 Determine foreign tax credit on a pooled basis
 Tax currently “excess” returns associated with transfers of
intangibles to a related CFC subject to a low foreign
effective tax rate
 Clarify the definition of intangible property to include
workforce in place, goodwill and going concern value for
transfer pricing and section 367(d) purposes
 Modify the tax rules for dual capacity taxpayers to limit tax
credit to host country generally applicable income tax rate
 Limit earnings stripped by expatriated entities

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Principal Components of the Camp Discussion Draft
and Enzi Bill









Maximum corporate rate of 25 percent
Exemption of 95 percent of dividends attributable to active business
conducted by a 10 percent owned corporate subsidiary
− Treatment of 10/50 companies
− Treatment of branches
− Expenses allocable to exempt income
 Sale of CFC stock
Subpart F income
− Active financing income
Base erosion alternatives
− Excess returns from transferred intangibles
− Low-taxed cross border foreign income treated as Subpart F income
− Foreign intangible income treated as Subpart F income but taxed at
preferential rate
− Deduction for foreign income derived from a trade or business in the U.S.
Thin capitalization/interest allocation
Repatriation
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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Fiscal Responsibility Commission


Individual Taxes (Illustrative Proposal)
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−

Three brackets—12/22/28
Repeal AMT, Pease and PEP
Capital gains and dividends taxed at ordinary rates
Maintain current law (or an equivalent) for the EITC and Child Tax Credit
12 percent non-refundable tax credit for mortgage interest on mortgages
below $500,000
Cap and then phase out employer provided health insurance
12 percent non-refundable tax credit for charitable contributions in excess
of 2 percent of AGI
Eliminate exclusion for newly issued state and municipal bonds
Consolidate and cap retirement accounts
Eliminate all other income tax expenditures

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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Fiscal Responsibility Commission



Business Taxes
− One Bracket- 28%
− Eliminate





Domestic Production Credit
LIFO
General Business Credits
“Other” tax expenditures

− Foreign source income
 Active Income taxed on territorial basis
 Current law for passive income
• No VAT

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Debt Reduction Task Force



Major Individual Tax Recommendations
−
−
−
−
−
−
−

−

Two brackets—17/27 percent
Capital gains and dividends taxed as ordinary income
Reform EITC
15 percent refundable credit for mortgage interest and charitable
deductions
Eliminate deduction for state and local taxes
15 percent refundable tax credit for retirement savings contributions up to
lesser of 20 percent of earnings or $20,000
Include 100 percent of Social Security benefits in income with 15 percent
tax credit of individual’s social security benefits plus a credit equal to 15
percent of the standard deduction
Allow deduction of miscellaneous itemized deductions in excess of 5
percent of AGI

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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Debt Reduction Task Force



Corporate Tax
− Corporate rate of 27%
− No territorial tax
− Eliminate tax expenditures



Establish a 6.5% VAT

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Stakes in Reforming Individual Taxation



What are the goals?
− Revenue neutrality?
− Distributional neutrality?



What is the debate about?
− Rates
− Base
− Distribution

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Stakes In Reforming Business Taxation


Revenue
− FY12- $251b., 10% of total federal revenue



“Competitiveness”

− Standard of living v. multinational competitiveness“
 The goal of any reform of our international tax system should be
to advance the [national] welfare of the United States.” John M.
Samuels, “American Tax Isolationism,” Tax Notes, June 29,
2009


Revenue neutrality is generally accepted as best
possible outcome for business
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation Memorandum, October 27, 2011
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Stakes In Reforming Business Taxation – cont’d


Rate v. Base
− Base broadening/rate reduction
 Winners and losers
• Domestics v. multinationals
• Manufacturing v. other sectors
• “C” Corporations v. pass-throughs
 JCT has estimated 28% revenue neutral rate based on the elimination
of domestic tax preferences applicable to corporations only
• Rate could go lower if the tax preferences claimed by pass-through
entities were also eliminated
 Administration 28% rate depends on using international reforms plus
additional revenue sources
• Expand corporate tax to include “large” pass-through entities
• Limit C corporation interest deductibility (“thin capitalization” rules)
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation Memorandum, October 27, 2011
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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Worldwide Effective Tax Rate
RATE Coalition vs. WIN America Campaign

Source: Martin Sullivan Calculations 134 Tax Notes 1486 (March 19, 2012)
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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Joint Committee Very Preliminary Estimate of Revenue Lost by Reducing
the Corporate Rate to 28 Percent and the Revenue Gained by Repealing
Certain Tax Expenditures for All Business Income - 2012-2021

Reduction in corporate rate to 28 %
Interaction with corporate rate change
Revenue Gain of Selected Tax Expenditures
U.S. manufacturing deduction
Research and experimentation credit
LIFO and LCM
Accelerated cost recovery
Oil and gas and fossil fuel production incentives
Low income housing credit
Municipal bond interest exclusion
Like kind exchanges

-717.5 b
-243.0 b

163.9 b
160.2 b
72.6 b
724.1 b
24.2 b
6.0 b
34.8 b
18.2 b

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation Memorandum, October 27, 2011

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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The Stakes n Reforming Business Taxation---cont’d


Rate v. Base cont’d
− Other “base broadeners” come into play
 Changes to accounting rules
 Changes to other cost recovery rules
 Limitations on the use of operating loss and tax credit carryovers
 Limitations on the use of acquired tax losses and carryovers



Taxation of non-U.S. source income
− All multinationals lose if international preferences may be used to reduce overall
rate (Obama)
− Some win and some lose if non-U.S. source income rules are revised on a revenue
neutral basis (Camp/Enzi)



Pass-Throughs v. Corps
− 70 percent of U.S. business income is earned by pass-throughs
− Elimination of business tax preferences results in a tax increase for this sector
− Creating parity is difficult



No consensus in the business community
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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Timing and Potential Outcomes






The Effect of the Election
The comparison to 1986
− Treasury Studies
− Executive leadership
Timing

© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A.
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tax notes
How to Think About
Real Tax Reform
By Harry L. Gutman

Harry L. Gutman

Harry L. Gutman, a
former chief of staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation, is the principal in
charge of KPMG LLP’s federal tax legislative and regulatory services group. The
views expressed in this report are those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of KPMG.

The author thanks Bennett Minton for invaluable research assistance.
This report exposes tax reform misconceptions
and provides basic facts and analytic tools to assist
the reader in reaching an informed decision about
the real trade-offs and appropriate outcomes in the
tax reform debate.
Copyright 2012 Harry L. Gutman.
All rights reserved.
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The country faces a perilous fiscal situation.
Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke has described
the end of this year as a ‘‘fiscal cliff.’’ The 2001 and
2003 tax cuts and the annual alternative minimum
tax patch expire. So do the 2 percentage point
payroll tax cut, many unemployment benefits, the
Medicare reimbursement ‘‘doc fix,’’ and several
other temporary tax provisions that are extended
perennially. Sequestration mandated by last summer’s Budget Control Act will become effective for
fiscal 2013 and the existing national debt limit may
have been reached. The Congressional Budget Office released a paper in May addressing the economic effects of reducing the fiscal restraint that is
scheduled to occur in 2013.1 It concluded that if all
the scheduled tax increases and spending decreases
actually occurred, the economy ‘‘would probably be
judged to be in recession.’’2
Balancing short-term economic recovery needs
with long-term deficit reduction is a daunting task.
Too much fiscal contraction can jeopardize economic recovery. Failure to address the long-term
issues will put the country on an unsustainable
fiscal track. Those are problems a lame-duck Congress must address.
Douglas Elmendorf, head of the CBO, said recently that increasing tax revenues by one-sixth or
reducing entitlement spending by one-fourth could,
if done separately, put the country on a sustainable
fiscal path.3 But anyone who has tried to quantify
precisely what it would take to achieve those objectives understands the practical and political improbability of that outcome. Consequently, the
consensus of most objective observers is that revenues need to increase and spending, particularly
entitlement spending, must be reduced.4 This report
is about revenues.

1
CBO, ‘‘Economic Effects of Reducing the Fiscal Restraint
That Is Scheduled to Occur in 2013’’ (May 2012), Doc 2012-11046,
2012 TNT 100-32.
2
Id. at 2.
3
Douglas Elmendorf, ‘‘Back to the Classroom: A Visit to
Harvard University,’’ CBO (Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/publication/43017.
4
See, e.g., testimony of former Sen. Pete Domenici and Dr.
Alice Rivlin before the Senate Finance Committee (June 19,
2012), Doc 2012-13104, 2012 TNT 119-38.
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2012 TNT 21-26; CBO alternative fiscal scenario assumes extension of doc fix, increase in discretionary spending at the rate
of inflation, no enforcement of budget caps, extension of expiring tax provisions, and index AMT for inflation, as well as the
extra interest costs associated with each.

I. Introduction
The recently published Hamilton Project report,
‘‘A Dozen Economic Facts About Tax Reform,’’
stated in its introduction that ‘‘today’s tax reform
debates are often based on misconceptions.’’5 That
is an understatement. As my former employer Sen.
Pat Moynihan was fond of saying, ‘‘Everyone is
entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own
facts.’’6 The purpose of this report is to expose some
of those misconceptions and provide some basic
facts and tools to help reach an informed opinion
about the real trade-offs and appropriate outcomes
affecting the role taxes should play in mitigating the
daunting fiscal challenge.7
The first section will provide a macro context,
reviewing briefly the most recent CBO budget forecasts, comparing the tax burden in the United States
with that of the other OECD countries, and finally
looking at the revenue sources in all the OECD
countries. The next section will describe the policy
objectives of any tax regime: equity, efficiency, and
administrability. It will compare two fundamental
tax bases: income and consumption. Next, it will
define and discuss the tax expenditure concept,
which provides a framework from which to analyze
both the extent to which government spending is

5
Hamilton Project, ‘‘A Dozen Economic Facts About Tax
Reform’’ (May 2012).
6
Id.
7
See also S. Douglas Hopkins, ‘‘Factual Distortions Derail
Productive Debate on Tax Reform,’’ Tax Notes, June 18, 2012, p.
1517, Doc 2012-11567, or 2012 TNT 119-7.
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accomplished through the tax system and the benefits and deficiencies of using the tax system in that
way. The next two sections will comment on the
taxation of business income and the wealth transfer
tax. The final section will describe the practical
constraints on legislative action. The specific congressional procedural rules that govern the consideration of tax legislation, as well as the need for
executive leadership, will be addressed.
The discussion will assume that because of the
budget situation any tax changes will have to be
revenue neutral at a minimum. In other words, any
tax reductions will have to be offset by equivalent
tax increases. Thus, the tax reform world will resemble a poker game, which is revenue neutral
because a finite amount of money comes to the
game and the same amount leaves, but in different
pockets. The real question is who will pay.
II. Macro Data
The CBO budget projections provide the economic context for this discussion. They are the projections that govern congressional consideration of
tax and spending legislation. Figure 1 shows the
CBO projection of the deficit based on two different
sets of assumptions. The upper line represents the
CBO projections determined under the baseline it is
required to use under the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Budget Act).8

8

P.L. 93-344.
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Figure 1. Total Budget Deficit — Total Dollars
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That baseline is, in substance, current law.9 Recognizing that is not likely to occur, the CBO has created
an alternative fiscal scenario, under which all the
expiring tax cuts are extended, spending caps are not
enforced, the doc fix is renewed, and other technical
changes assumed.10 That is the lower line on the
chart — a cumulative $11 trillion deficit over the next
10 years. The CBO has described the latter fiscal path
as unsustainable. Under it, public debt rises to 93.2
percent of GDP by 2022. It is also important to note,
while not shown on the figure, that federal tax revenues are currently at about 15 percent of GDP, well
below the recent historical average of approximately
18 percent.11
Figure 2 is a terrific Moynihan document. It
shows total tax revenue by types as a percentage of
GDP in the OECD countries.12 The United States is
ranked 31st out of 34. Some may think that is the

9
CBO, ‘‘The 2012 Long-Term Budget Outlook,’’ at 2 (June
2012), Doc 2012-12113, 2012 TNT 109-23.
10
Id. at 3.
11
Id. at 78.
12
OECD, ‘‘Revenue Statistics 1965-2010,’’ Table 2, at 82 (2011),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1707/883932508699.
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right place, but the U.S. tax burden is actually well
below that of the other OECD countries.
Figure 3 shows the specific tax sources of the
OECD countries by percentage of GDP in 2008.13
The United States is about the same in income taxes,
lower in Social Security taxes (to be expected because of the more extensive social safety nets in
many of the OECD countries), and not even close in
consumption taxes. In fact, the United States is the
only country out of 163 surveyed that does not have
a national consumption tax.
While that anticipates the end of the story, you do
not have to be too clever to connect the dots of a
fiscal dilemma, relatively low taxation, and an
untapped revenue source.
III. Tax System Design
When policymakers confront the question of
what a tax system should look like they focus on
three criteria: equity, efficiency, and administrability. Equity reflects judgments as to the appropriate
distribution of the tax burden. Efficiency means that

13

Id.
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Figure 2. Types of Tax Revenue as Share of GDP, 2009
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Figure 3. Tax Source as Share of GDP, 2008
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the system should be neutral regarding decisionmaking. Administrability means that the system
should impose the least possible compliance and
administrative costs. Our existing system is a disgrace when measured against each of those criteria.
A. Equity
The appropriate distribution of the tax burden is
a subjective decision to be made by our elected
representatives. We would see more sensible outcomes if politicians made some effort to understand
it rather than mouthing platitudes that score political points but are demonstrably wrong.
We start with the falsehood du jour — ‘‘only 46
percent of American households pay federal tax.’’
Forty-six percent is an estimate by the BrookingsUrban Institute Tax Policy Center, but it represents
households that did not have income tax liability in
2011.14 Moreover, the number is anomalous because
incomes were depressed in 2011 and two temporary
tax cuts that were enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 removed many
from the tax rolls. In 2007, before the economic
downturn, 60 percent of households paid income
taxes.15
A more accurate measure would take into account the payroll tax. When that is done, the
number of households paying federal tax was 83

14

Chuck Marr and Chye-Ching Huang, ‘‘Misconceptions and
Realities About Who Pays Taxes,’’ Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities (Apr. 11, 2012), Doc 2012-7669, 2012 TNT 71-33.
15
Id.
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Finally, those numbers do not take state and local
taxes into account. Recent data show that in 2011
the bottom fifth of households paid 12.3 percent of
their incomes in state and local taxes.17 When all
taxes are taken into account, the bottom one-fifth of
households pay an average of 16 percent of their
incomes in taxes.18 That is quite a different distributional picture from that suggested by some
‘‘scholars’’ and television commentators — as well
as some unnamed senators who surely know better.
One other word about the distribution of federal
income tax liability: Over the last 50 years, tax rates
for the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans have
declined 40 percent while tax rates for the rest of the
population have remained roughly the same.19
Since 1979, earnings for that top 1 percent have
risen 250 percent.20 Those who have received the
largest income gains have also seen the largest tax
cuts, thus materially reducing the overall progressivity of the income tax. So, while it is true that the
share of taxes paid by the top 1 percent has increased, it is because their share of income has also
increased. The top 1 percent of Americans paid 28
percent of federal income tax revenues in 2007
(compared with 15.4 percent in 1979).21 That
group’s share of income was 19.4 of total U.S.
income in 2007 as compared with 9.3 percent in
1979.22 Overall, a distribution of federal income
taxes across all households for 2011 would show
mild progressivity, with the effective tax rate as a
percentage of gross income on the highest quintile
at 14.9 percent.23 The rate for the top 1 percent was
20.3 — and for the top 0.1 percent it was 19.8.24
Whether that distribution is equitable is a social
judgment. But that judgment should be based on a
comprehensive analysis of the tax burden and not
isolated segments.

16

Tax Policy Center, ‘‘Tax Units With Zero or Negative Tax
Liability, Current Law, 2004-2011,’’ T11-0173 (June 14, 2011), Doc
2011-13102, 2011 TNT 116-43.
17
Marr and Huang, supra note 14.
18
Id.
19
Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney, ‘‘Just How Progressive Is the U.S. Tax Code?’’ The Hamilton Project (Apr. 13,
2012), Doc 2012-7934, 2012 TNT 73-60.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Tax Policy Center, ‘‘Average Effective Federal Tax Rates by
Cash Income Percentiles, 2011; Baseline: Current Law,’’ T12-0018
(Feb. 8, 2012), Doc 2012-2600, 2012 TNT 27-34.
24
Id.
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percent in 2009 and 86 percent in 2007.16 Most of
those who pay no federal tax are elderly, disabled,
students, or unemployed.
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filed under Dick Armey’s ‘‘flat’’ tax.26 There is no
category for interest, dividends, and capital gain. It
is hard to believe that the American public would
accept that distribution of the tax burden, unless it
was accompanied by some form of tax on capital.
There is nothing magic about a flat tax. The term
simply describes a system in which a single rate is
imposed on a specified tax base. The real question is
what the base should be. The Forbes/Armey tax
base was consumption. Take that observation one
step further: If that is a good tax, so is a VAT
because the base of both is consumption — they are
just collected differently. One suspects that the
attraction of the Forbes/Armey flat tax is that it is
advertised as a replacement for the income tax and
the VAT is viewed as an add-on tax. That may be
true as a political matter, but it cannot obscure the
fact that the taxes are economically identical.
No matter which tax base is chosen, all theorists
agree that as an efficiency matter the tax should
include the entire base. The bases of our income
taxes are far from comprehensive. That has serious
equity and economic consequences, most of which
have not been empirically quantified.
So how to think about that? The term ‘‘tax
expenditure’’ is the tool we will use. In the 1960s
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Stanley
Surrey was searching for a term to describe the
provisions in the tax code that were not necessary to
define income. The purpose of the exercise was to
identify them — not to make a judgment about their
merit — so that they could be subjected to a
traditional cost-benefit analysis.27
Tax expenditures were defined as ‘‘revenue
losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption or
deduction from gross income or which provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral
of tax liability.’’28 For example, the home mortgage
interest deduction is a tax expenditure. Why? An
income tax does not permit the deduction of expenses that produce nontaxed income. Home mortgage interest is an expense related to exempt
income — the imputed rental value of the home it
finances. Thus, it is a tax expenditure. Now, turn it
around and analyze the deduction as a government
spending program. It is available only to those who
own their homes, not to those who rent. Thus, it
encourages homeownership. But it is available only
to homeowners who itemize their deductions —
only 30 percent of the taxpayers who pay income

26

25
See Michael J. Graetz, ‘‘Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax,’’ 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575, 1598-1600 (1979).
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B. Efficiency
Now we turn to economics and economists. To be
sure, economists can add value to this debate, but
remember — they would say that the way to open
a can on a deserted island is to assume a can opener.
They would also tell you that a person who fought
in the Civil War and one who paid $300 to have
someone fight for him had an equivalent experience. The point is that economic theory does not
always produce the optimal societal result when
evaluated against experience, intuition, and common sense.
The ideal tax system is neutral as to its economic
effects. Our system fails that test. It is a hybrid
system that contains some elements of a consumption tax, particularly our treatment of retirement
savings, and some elements of an income tax. It
affects economic behavior and is used as a substitute delivery mechanism for a multitude of government programs ranging from low-income support
to subsidies for specific activities. As a consequence,
it is an administrative and compliance nightmare.
The conceptual starting point is to identify the
tax base. As a practical matter there are two choices:
income or consumption, and they are related
(I = C + S). Thus, the income tax base includes
consumption plus savings. The consumption tax
base equals income minus savings. A different way
of expressing that relationship is to say that a
consumption tax exempts from the tax base the
normal return on an investment, a formulation
familiar to finance experts as the ‘‘immediate
deduction-yield exemption equivalence.’’25 For
many economists, that fact — the exemption of the
normal return from invested capital from the tax
base — is a fundamental reason to prefer consumption rather than income as the tax base. From an
efficiency perspective, the consumption tax removes the tax wedge from investment decisions
and creates a more level decision-making field.
However, that is where efficiency as a goal collides with equity considerations. Another way of
looking at a consumption tax is to observe that a
consumption tax is paid only by wage earners and
those who aren’t saving. The latter group is those
who borrow heavily — perhaps students with high
debt burdens — and more importantly, those who
are consuming their savings — retirees. One can
question the fairness of a tax system whose burden
is borne by students, wage earners, and retirees.
And there is nothing secret about it — all one need
to do is look at the simple tax form that would be
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and local taxes, the home mortgage interest deduction, the charitable contribution deduction, and the
step-up in basis at death. Apart from the political
constituency that supports each of those items, one
must recognize that many of them are spending
programs that cannot simply be cut off without real
economic consequences. The notion that tax reductions can be funded by eliminating many of them is
naive.36 However, they could be redesigned to
provide benefits in a more rational way; for example, turning them into refundable credits that
phase out as incomes rise37 or, as the Obama
administration has proposed, limiting the tax benefit to 28 percent.
C. Administrability
There is universal recognition that the complexity of the tax code has led to a system that is almost
impossible to administer efficiently. The call for
simplification is universal — until specifics are put
on the table, and then consensus disappears. IRS
funding is being decreased while Congress is enacting more spending programs for the Service to
administer, and when international tax minimization is becoming increasingly prevalent. It should
be obvious that unless and until the tax structure is
streamlined, an administrable system is a pipe
dream.
IV. Business Taxation
Virtually no day passes without some mention in
the business press about business tax reform. The
president’s ‘‘Framework for Business Tax Reform’’
described the problem succinctly and accurately:
The United States has a relatively narrow
corporate tax base compared to other countries — a tax base reduced by loopholes, tax
expenditures and tax planning. This is combined with a statutory corporate rate that will
soon be the highest among advanced countries. As a result of this combination of a
relatively narrow tax base and a high statutory
rate, the U.S. tax system is uncompetitive and
inefficient. The system distorts choices such as
where to produce, what to invest in, how to
finance a business, and what business form to
use. And it does too little to encourage job
creation and investment in the United States
while allowing firms to benefit from incentives
to locate production and shift profits overseas.

36
See, e.g., John L. Buckley, ‘‘Tax Expenditure Reform: Some
Common Misconceptions,’’ Tax Notes, July 18, 2011, p. 255, Doc
2011-13056, or 2011 TNT 138-6.
37
See, e.g., Bipartisan Policy Center, ‘‘The Debt Reduction
Task Force, Restoring America’s Future’’ (Nov. 2010), Doc 201024611, 2010 TNT 222-29.
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tax.29 Finally, the value of the deduction increases as
the taxpayer’s tax bracket increases. When translated into a government program to subsidize housing, it is a program that is available only to a limited
number of homeowners, and the wealthier they are,
the bigger the benefit. If it were a direct spending
program to encourage homeownership, is that how
Congress would design it?
That example illustrates an important point
about tax expenditures that provide deductions or
exclusions from income: They are worth more the
higher a beneficiary’s tax bracket. That may be how
some spending programs would be designed, but
not many.
The tax expenditure concept has become virtually universally accepted, not necessarily by name
but by the recognition that those provisions are the
source of disguised spending and distortions in the
tax base. The Joint Committee on Taxation and the
Office of Management and Budget are required by
the Budget Act to publish a list of tax expenditures
annually.30 The list published in 1972 contained 62
items.31 Today’s list has more than 280.32
The total static revenue loss attributable to tax
expenditures in 2011 was $1.3 trillion (compared
with $63.2 billion in 1972).33 The entire federal
direct expenditure budget in 2011 was $3.6 trillion.34
In other words, 26 percent of federal spending last
year was accomplished through the tax code. And
different tax expenditures affect different groups.
The earned income tax credit, child tax credit, and
dependent care credit principally benefit the bottom
40 percent; retirement savings incentives the top 20
percent; and capital gains and dividend preferences
the top 1 percent.35
Significant spending reductions (and increased
revenues) could occur through the repeal or reduction of those tax expenditures. And that is how most
tax reformers want to finance rate reduction. But we
must be clear about how much can realistically be
accomplished by that form of base broadening. The
largest individual tax expenditures are retirement
savings incentives, the exclusion for employerprovided health insurance, the deduction for state
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A. The Proposals
1. The framework. The administration has outlined
a business tax reform plan that would reduce the
corporate tax rate from 35 to 28 percent. The revenue cost of that rate reduction would be offset by
repeal or substantial modification of several tax
preferences and incentives, as well as several more
fundamental changes in the taxation of business
income. The framework must be read in conjunction with the budget proposals described in greater
detail in Treasury’s ‘‘General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals,’’40 which are discussed below. (An asterisk
indicates an item is included in the General Explanation.) The latter document provides additional
detail to several of the proposals mentioned in the
framework.

The major aspects of the framework would:
• reduce the highest corporate rate to 28 percent;
• increase the domestic production deduction to
10.7 percent, thereby providing a 25 percent
maximum rate for domestic manufacturing
income, with an 18 percent deduction for income attributable to advanced technology
property, paid for by excluding income from
oil and gas and other fossil fuel production and
some other non-manufacturing activities from
the domestic production deduction;
• make the research and experimentation tax
credit permanent and increase the rate of the
alternative simplified research credit from 14 to
17 percent;
• make permanent and refundable the tax credit
for renewable energy generation*41 and
broaden the tax base by eliminating dozens of
tax expenditures, such as:
• last-in, first-out inventory accounting, with
a 10-year transition*;
• oil and gas and fossil fuel production preferences*; and
• special depreciation rules for noncommercial aircraft*;
• impose a minimum tax on offshore income
earned by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations;
• deny deductions for expenses attributable to
moving operations abroad;
• tax the excess profits associated with intangibles that have been transferred to low-tax
jurisdictions*; and
• deny deductions for interest attributable to
overseas investment until the related income is
taxed in the United States.*
The framework implicitly acknowledges that the
enactment of the foregoing proposals would not be
revenue neutral. It suggests three other items to
address the revenue shortfall:
• end accelerated deprecation;
• limit the deductibility of corporate interest;
and
• establish greater parity in the tax treatment of
large corporations and large passthrough entities through either expanding the reach of the
corporate tax or integrating the corporate and
individual taxes.*42
2. The administration’s fiscal 2013 revenue proposals.43 Most commentary has focused on the
framework since its release. However, as part of the

38

The White House and Treasury, ‘‘The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform,’’ at 1 (Feb. 22, 2012), Doc
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The system is also too complicated — especially for small businesses.38
Like the personal income tax, resolution of those
problems cannot occur in a vacuum. The same fiscal
challenges dictate that any responsible reformation
of business taxation must be revenue neutral, at a
minimum. Moreover, that more than 70 percent of
net business income in the United States is earned
by entities that are not subject to the corporate tax
adds another complication to the equation.39 The
latter makes it clear that reform of business taxation
cannot logically occur without a concurrent examination of individual taxation.
To date, the business tax reform discussion has
been long on rhetoric and short on detail. That is not
surprising. In the zero-sum game that is created by
budget constraints, the expressed goals may be
unattainable without an additional revenue source,
specifically a national consumption tax. Discussion
of that alternative by those who would have to
enact it is viewed as political suicide. Hence, we
have mostly aspirational objectives articulated by
the administration, the chairs of the House Ways
and Means and Budget committees, the president’s
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform (the Bowles-Simpson commission), and the
report of the Debt Reduction Task Force, commissioned by the Bipartisan Policy Center. However,
without detailed, comprehensive proposals, one is
left to speculate about the impact of change on any
of the shortcomings described above.
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Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I.45 The JCT has scored
the bill as raising $46.7 billion over 10 years, far
short of the amount needed to fund a repeal of the
AMT.46 The Senate has rejected attempts to bring
the legislation up for consideration.
4. The path to prosperity (the ‘Ryan budget’).47 The
House has adopted the budget proposals of the
Budget Committee. The budget calls for a maximum corporate rate of 25 percent, broadening ‘‘the
tax base to maintain revenue growth at a level
consistent with current tax policy’’ and shifting to a
territorial system for taxing income earned outside
the United States.48 The budget offers no practical
guidance because it fails to quantify its revenue
growth target and does not indicate how the base
should be broadened to attain that goal.
5. The Camp and Enzi proposals.49 Ways and
Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., has
released a detailed proposal that proposes a participation exemption (territorial) system to address the
treatment of business income earned outside the
United States. He also would reduce the corporate
tax rate to 25 percent. The committee summary
states that the goal would be achieved on a revenueneutral basis by broadening the corporate tax base.
However, specific base-broadening provisions are
not included in the draft.
The principal elements of the Camp draft are:
• a maximum corporate rate of 25 percent;
• exemption of 95 percent of dividends attributable to active business received by a 10 percent
U.S. corporate shareholder from a CFC;
• treatment of branches as corporations;
• current taxation of highly mobile passive income;
• the alternative proposals to address base erosion;
• interest allocation rules; and
• taxation at 5.25 percent of all existing foreign
earnings held offshore.
The Enzi bill is similar. The principal differences
are for the base erosion alterative, the treatment of
branches, the interest allocation provision, and the

45

S. 2059, Paying a Fair Share Act of 2012.
JCT, Revenue Estimate, Mar. 20, 2012, Doc 2012-5868, 2012
TNT 55-30.
47
Paul Ryan, ‘‘The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for American Renewal, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Resolution’’ (Mar. 20,
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fiscal 2013 budget, the administration made more
than 125 specific revenue proposals to provide
incentives for job creation and growth, tax cuts for
families, initiatives to provide regional growth,
reduction of the tax gap, and structural simplification that reach well beyond the taxation of corporate income.
The major proposals in addition to those mentioned in the framework include:
• extending the Bush-era individual tax provisions for those with incomes below $250,000,
and reinstate the 36 and 39.6 percent rates and
the Pease overall limitation on the ability to
claim itemized deductions and the personal
exemption phaseout for upper-income taxpayers;
• taxing qualified dividends as ordinary income;
• taxing long-term capital gains at a 20 percent
rate for upper-income taxpayers;
• limiting the value of itemized deductions and
specified above-the-line deductions and exclusions to 28 percent;
• restoring the wealth transfer tax to its 2009
levels with a maximum rate of 45 percent, a
$3.5 million exclusion for estate and
generation-skipping transfer taxes, and a $1
million exclusion for gift taxes;
• extending the 100 percent depreciation deduction through 2012;
• extending other expired provisions, such as the
subpart F active financing income exception
and the controlled foreign corporation ‘‘lookthrough’’ rule through 2012;
• providing a temporary 10 percent incremental
new jobs and wage credit for 2012;
• providing a suite of tax benefits for energyconserving expenditures;
• determining the foreign tax credit on a pooling
basis;
• modifying the tax rules for some dual-capacity
taxpayers;
• imposing a financial crisis responsibility fee of
17 basis points of covered liabilities;
• repealing lower of cost or market inventory
accounting with a four-year transition; and
• clarifying the worker classification rules.
3. The ‘Buffett rule.’44 The administration has also
proposed a 30 percent minimum tax on households
with more than $1 million of income. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner has said that the ‘‘Buffett rule’’ would replace the AMT. A bill that incorporates the concept has been introduced by Sen.
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V. The Unanswered Questions
While consistent in some respects, there are significant differences among the proposals. That lack
of specificity raises several important questions,
which can be grouped into three broad categories:
the corporate rate and base, the taxation of foreignsource income, and the interaction of corporate and
individual taxes.
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A. The Corporate Rate and Base
Reduction of the corporate rate is very important.
It will make the United States more attractive for
foreign investment and will reduce incentives to
move income offshore. All the proposals espouse a
reduction of the corporate tax rate to between 25
and 29 percent. All the proposals also assume an
outcome that is at least revenue neutral. The unanswered question is how they get there.
As noted earlier, the administration has proposed
several specific base broadeners in both the framework and its budget. The administration would use
revenue from its proposed international reforms to
offset the cost of rate reductions and making the
expanded research credit permanent. The additional benefit to domestic manufacturing is designed to be revenue neutral, with the revenue
offset coming from the elimination of the deduction
for non-manufacturing activity.
The administration has not provided any revenue estimate of the total cost of rate reduction and
a permanent research credit. However, one can
roughly estimate the cost by referring to two
sources: the JCT very preliminary revenue table of
October 27, 2011, provided to Ways and Means
ranking minority member Sander M. Levin,
D-Mich.,54 and the JCT estimate of the cost of
making the research credit permanent.55 According
to the JCT, a reduction of the corporate rate to 28
percent would cost $717.5 billion over 10 years, and
interactions would reduce revenues by an additional $243 billion, for a total cost of $960.5 billion
(or roughly $137 billion per point). The JCT has
estimated the cost of research and experimentation
permanence to be $99.3 billion. Thus, the total
amount needed from base broadening is $1.06 trillion.
The enactment of all the base broadeners in the
administration’s budget would not come close to
raising that amount. Indeed, according to the JCT,
enacting all the suggested business base broadeners
would raise roughly $287 billion.56 Thus, the question is how much could be raised by enacting all or
some of the additional revenue proposals that appeared in the framework: repealing accelerated cost
recovery, limiting interest deductibility, expanding
the corporate tax base to include large passthrough

54
JCT, ‘‘Estimated Revenue Effects of Corporate Tax Reform
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taxation of unrepatriated offshore earnings. Regarding the last, the bill would allow a 70 percent
deduction for actual and electively deemed repatriations of offshore earnings.
6. The Cantor bill.50 The Small Business Tax Cut
Act, which has passed the House, would provide a
one-year 20 percent deduction of ‘‘qualified business income’’ earned by entities with less than 500
employees, subject to a limit of half the wages to
employees. The JCT has estimated the cost of the
bill to be $46 billion and has commented that its
effects on the economy would be ‘‘so small as to be
incalculable.’’51
7. The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform.52 The presidentially appointed
Bowles-Simpson commission recommended the following:
• a single corporate tax rate between 23 and 29
percent;
• elimination of all business tax expenditures;
• adoption of a territorial system for active
foreign-source business income; and
• current taxation of foreign-source passive income.
8. The Debt Reduction Task Force.53 The Debt
Reduction Task Force, co-chaired by former Sen.
Pete Domenici and Dr. Alice Rivlin, was created by
the Bipartisan Policy Center, founded in 2007 by
former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Bob
Dole, Tom Daschle, and George Mitchell. Its November 2010 report recommended:
• a two-bracket corporate rate structure of 15
and 27 percent;
• elimination of many business tax expenditures;
• retention of accelerated methods of cost recovery;
• retention of current system of taxing foreignsource income; and
• a 6.5 percent deficit reduction sales tax (VAT).
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The explanation of Camp’s proposal states that
‘‘the rate reduction [to 25 percent] would be accomplished without increasing the deficit by broadening the tax base.’’58 Moreover, his reforms to the
international tax sector are intended to be revenue
neutral on their own: ‘‘Domestic base broadening
should [not] be used to finance international tax
relief, and vice versa.’’59 Thus, for Camp, the crucial
threshold is which domestic business tax preferences are to be eliminated to finance a rate reduction to 25 percent.
The JCT analysis indicates that repeal of all the
domestic business tax preferences that are attributable to corporations (including the manufacturing
deduction, the research and experimentation credit,
and accelerated cost recovery) could pay for a rate
reduction to 28 percent.60 Additional repeal of the
business tax preferences used by noncorporate taxpayers would raise an additional $300 billion, thus
permitting a rate reduction to approximately 25.8
percent.61 Likely transition relief is not reflected in
the estimate, nor is expected taxpayer behavioral
response taken into account in all cases.
The foregoing demonstrates that it is mathematically possible to offset a rate reduction to close to 25
percent — and there are many dials that can be
adjusted to get there. However, mathematical possibility and political possibility are two entirely
different animals. It is not likely that all the elements of the administration’s plan would be enacted, nor is it likely that all business tax
expenditures would be eliminated for all business
taxpayers to fund the Camp proposal — and even if
they were, undoubtedly there would be transition
relief that would reduce the revenue that could be
realized. The point is that short of repealing the
laws of arithmetic, corporate rates cannot be reduced to the levels discussed by the politicians
simply by reducing or eliminating business tax
preferences.
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It is, of course, possible to finance a corporate
rate reduction by increasing the tax rate on dividends and capital gains. Energy taxes or a financial
transactions tax also could be used.
It is interesting that other countries have used
increased income taxes on high-income individuals
(as well as VATs) to fund corporate rate cuts.
Indeed, the Debt Reduction Task Force recommended a 6.5 percent VAT. It is possible to ameliorate the fiscal crisis by allowing the Bush tax cuts to
expire, even if that is postponed for a year or two
until the economic recovery is secure. However,
that will not provide revenues to reduce the corporate tax rate if revenue neutrality is the baseline.
Some would question the likelihood of the enactment of a VAT if Congress is unable to take the
easier political step of simply letting the existing tax
cuts expire to address the fiscal situation. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how the reduced corporate
rate objective can be reached without it or another
revenue source.
B. The Taxation of Foreign-Source Income
The appropriate way to tax business income
earned outside the United States is a particular
point of contention. In theory, there are two polar
ways to tax offshore business income attributable to
a U.S. enterprise. The first is to tax it all currently at
the U.S. corporate rate (the worldwide system) with
a tax credit for foreign taxes to eliminate double
taxation. The second is to allow the source country
to tax the income and permit the income to be
returned to the United States without the payment
of any U.S. tax (the territorial system). Under the
former system, foreign taxes below the U.S. rate are
irrelevant. In the latter, there is a U.S. tax advantage
to having foreign income sourced to a low-tax
jurisdiction. The current U.S. system is a hybrid of
the two. Some passive income is taxed currently at
the U.S. rate; the U.S. tax on most active business
income is deferred until the income is repatriated to
the United States.
The current system has been widely criticized on
three grounds. The first is the lockout effect. Deferral creates an incentive for U.S. companies to keep
active business earnings offshore, and it is estimated that unrepatriated foreign earnings amount
to at least $1.4 trillion.62 The second is the alleged
base erosion that occurs as U.S.-based multinational
companies transfer highly mobile, highly profitable
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entities, and imposing a minimum tax on foreignsource income. According to the JCT estimate provided to Levin, repeal of accelerated cost recovery
for all businesses (which is a timing issue) would
raise $724 billion over 10 years.57 The administration has provided no details or numbers for the
other three items, but they could certainly be designed in a way that would raise the amount
needed to close the gap.
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C. Interactive Corporate and Individual Tax
The interaction of the corporate and individual
taxes produces the thorniest problem in the business tax reform debate, and one that has yet to be
fully recognized and explored. If a reduction in the
corporate rate is financed by a reduction or elimination of business tax expenditures for all business
income, the result is a tax increase for those who
earn business income in passthrough form. That
appears to be a political non-starter, but it is the
only way to finance a corporate rate reduction to
approximately 25 percent by simply reducing business tax preferences.
The inextricable connection between the corporate and individual tax leads to one further observation. If individual rates are higher than corporate
rates, there is an incentive to use corporations to
shelter income. That is not a new phenomenon.
Many code provisions attempted to address that
problem: the accumulated earnings tax, the personal holding company tax, and the provisions
regarding collapsible corporations.
Virtually all tax commentators, regardless of their
political persuasion, agree that the two-tier corpoTAX NOTES, August 6, 2012

rate tax is a ‘‘bad’’ tax. Because corporate income is
taxed at the corporate level and then again when
distributed, it encourages business activity to be
undertaken in passthrough form. Because interest
payments are deductible and dividend distributions are not, the tax encourages debt rather than
equity financing. The commentators agree that the
two-tier corporate tax should be eliminated and
that business income should be taxed once — and
only once — no matter the entity in which the
income is earned. That is called integration, and
there have been several studies proposing various
ways to implement it.63 Indeed, in 2003 the Bush
administration proposed a form of integration: a
dividend exclusion.64 The proposal was opposed by
many major corporations, perhaps because of a
desire to control the expenditure of retained earnings. Dividend relief would encourage the distribution of those earnings.
Implementing an integration system is difficult
under the best circumstances. The revenue lost by
eliminating double tax would have to be offset. As
a starting point, that should be done in a way that
does not alter the distributional burden associated
with the existing tax. In other words, if we knew
who actually bears the economic burden of the
corporate tax we could repeal it and explicitly
increase the tax on those taxpayers. For example, if
the burden of the corporate tax was borne by
shareholders, dividend and capital gains could be
increased, altering the distribution of the tax. On the
other hand, if the burden is borne principally by
labor, a VAT could come close to being distributionally neutral. The problem is that we do not know
the answer to that question. Moreover, even if we
did, replacing an implicit tax with an explicit one is
a difficult political exercise — particularly without
strong public support. As a result, it does not
appear that the correct solution is on the horizon,
leaving us with ad hoc solutions that will create
many planning opportunities and enforcement difficulties.
D. Lack of Business Consensus
The business community is by no means united
on tax reform objectives. While it is safe to assume
that all corporate taxpayers would like to see the
nominal corporate rate reduced, the requirement of
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intangible assets to low-tax jurisdictions. The third
is the complexity of the law.
U.S.-based multinational companies, pointing to
the fact that most other developed countries have
moved to a form of territorial taxation, advocate the
adoption of a similar system in the United States.
They cite an inability to compete effectively in the
foreign jurisdictions as one reason for change. The
other is to eliminate the lockout effect that the
current system has for foreign earnings.
Others assert that the territorial system by definition provides an incentive for U.S. companies to
locate active businesses outside the United States,
thus promoting domestic job loss. Their answer is to
move the United States closer to an effective worldwide system by eliminating or sharply reducing
deferral. There is no lockout in a world in which all
offshore income is subject to U.S. tax immediately.
Moreover, they state that the appropriate way to
view U.S. competitiveness is to examine how a
particular policy affects the domestic standard of
living. Thus, competitiveness arguments of the multinationals must be analyzed by measuring whether
the benefit to the U.S. economy of a multinational’s
ability to compete in a foreign jurisdiction compensates for the loss of domestic economic activity that
is encouraged by a territorial system.
The polar positions regarding the optimal international tax regime are reflected in the administration’s proposals on one side and the Camp
proposals on the other. The dichotomy is also seen
in the contrasting proposals of the Bowles-Simpson
and Domenici-Rivlin task forces.
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intended to be revenue neutral to the international
sector. That means that there will be winners and
losers within that sector, which may well affect the
enthusiasm with which particular companies embrace the proposal.
Apart from, but related to, the design of the
territorial system is the question of how to treat the
$1.4 trillion of currently unrepatriated corporate
offshore earnings. Major U.S. multinationals
formed the WIN America Campaign to lobby for a
second tax holiday for those earnings. They seek a
repeat of the 2004 Homeland Investment Act, under
which unrepatriated earnings could be returned to
the United States at a 5 percent tax rate. To date,
their efforts have not been successful. The JCT has
estimated that the provision would lose $78.7 billion over 10 years.66 Camp and Geithner have both
indicated that consideration of that proposal should
be in the context of overall business tax reform.67
Camp’s proposal contains a mandatory 5 percent
tax on all unrepatriated earnings, with an opportunity to defer payment over eight years with an
interest charge. Enzi’s bill contains a similar provision. However, his provision is elective, with an
applicable tax rate on the repatriated earnings of
10.5 percent. It is unlikely that the issue will be
addressed independently of overall business tax
reform.
2. Domestic versus multinational companies.
Many domestic corporations, particularly in the
retail and service industries, have federal effective
tax rates that are at or near the statutory 35 percent
rate. Many multinationals, particularly those in the
pharmaceutical and high-tech industries, have effective rates in the mid- to low 20s.68 Obviously,
revenue-neutral reform will affect those sectors
differently, and the extent to which that will occur
depends on how the rate reduction will be financed.
For example, repeal of the section 199 deduction or
failure to extend the research credit will not affect
service or retail companies. Those sectors will be in
favor of any rate reduction financed by those
sources. Multinational companies will want to
avoid having their preferences reduced to pay for
domestic rate reduction. As a general proposition, a
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revenue neutrality introduces discord. It is no secret
that while the U.S. corporate rate is 35 percent, there
are many corporations with effective tax rates well
below that number.65 For any company, the question will be whether business tax reform results in a
higher effective tax rate. The answer will depend on
how the corporate rate reduction is financed. There
are four potential areas of conflict: the structure of
international tax reform, domestic companies versus multinationals, capital-intensive domestic corporations versus other domestic corporations, and
passthrough entities versus C corporations.
1. The structure of international tax reform. Multinational companies have two goals: a territorial tax
system and tax relief for the repatriation of offshore
earnings. Three questions emerge. Will the reform
of the international tax system move in the direction
of a territorial system or toward making the worldwide system more effective? If the former, what will
the system look like? What will be the revenue
consequences to the multinational sector of any
changes?
The first question can’t be answered now. The
administration’s proposals explicitly reject a territorial system. Moreover, they would extract revenue
from the multinational sector to finance the corporate rate reduction. Most multinationals would find
that that alternative would increase their effective
tax rate.
Assuming a territorial system, there are a series
of design issues that have serious consequences.
The first is the scope of the income that will be
subject to the system. Both the Camp and Enzi
proposals (as well as all territorial systems adopted
around the world) limit the system to income
attributable to active business. One important
threshold question then is the definition of active
business. Conversely, the benefit of the system is
not available for passive income. The questions here
involve the definition of passive income and how
that income will be taxed in the United States — for
example, currently or when repatriated. Both Camp
and Enzi would treat passive income as currently
taxable in the United States. All other territorial
systems have some form of base erosion protection,
and the question is what the United States will
adopt. The Camp and Enzi proposals contain several options, the consequences of which have to be
analyzed by each multinational company.
The revenue consequences to the international
sector obviously will depend on the structure of the
system that is adopted. The administration’s proposal will increase the tax burden of that sector. In
contrast, both the Camp and Enzi proposals are
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E. Wealth Transfer Tax
One of the most baffling aspects of the reform
debate has to do with the wealth transfer taxes. At
a $3.5 million exemption level, the tax will affect
less than 0.3 percent of individuals dying each
year.69 However, the revenue associated with the
tax is not insignificant. At that level and with a
maximum rate of 45 percent, the tax is estimated to
raise roughly $16 billion in 2013, rising to $29 billion
in 2019.70
Apart from revenue, there is an important policy
role for a tax on wealth transfers in our tax system.
Capital income is relatively lightly taxed by the
income tax and the appreciation in assets held at
death is forgiven by the rules that give an heir a
basis equal to date of death value. The wealth
transfer tax acts as a rough remedy to ensure that
some tax is paid by those owning appreciated
property.71 There would be no tax policy need for
the tax if death were treated as an income tax
realization event. Sensible rules can be devised to
deal with illiquid assets.
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VI. The Practical Constraints
There are two principal practical constraints associated with reform legislation: legislative procedural rules and the lack of executive leadership.
A. Procedural Rules
Congressional consideration of tax legislation is
governed by several procedural rules that have the
potential to materially affect the outcome. The most
obvious is the Senate filibuster, which can be overcome only by 60 votes to invoke cloture. Also,
special rules created by the Budget Enforcement Act
apply to tax legislation in both chambers.72
The procedural impediments in the Senate can be
overcome using reconciliation. If Congress adopts a
budget resolution that contains reconciliation instructions, the legislation that implements that
budget resolution is procedurally protected. The
implementing legislation is subject to a time limit
on debate and consequently cannot be filibustered.
Amendments must be germane. And most significantly, if the reconciliation instructions authorize
revenue-losing legislation, the legislation is not
subject to a Budget Act point of order as long as the
authorized revenue loss is not exceeded.
For the current Congress, the importance of those
procedural rules cannot be overemphasized. First,
Congress will not pass a budget resolution this
session. While not a law (that is, the president does
not sign it), the resolution must be agreed on by
both chambers, and that simply will not happen.
The upshot is that the normal procedural rules
apply. Because neither party has 60 votes in the
Senate, it is unlikely that any significant changes
can be adopted. Second, the November election
outcome will affect lame-duck consideration of legislation. For example, if either party secures a
majority in both chambers, a budget resolution in
the next Congress becomes more possible. The
content of that budget resolution would, of course,
depend on which party is in control. But the agenda
of that party could conceivably pass Congress using
reconciliation. The ultimate enactment of that legislation would depend on who is president. If the
president is of a different party, the possibility of a
veto would always remain. Alternatively, the election could result in each chamber controlled by a
different party, in which case agreement in the next
Congress would remain conjectural. None of those
post-election scenarios suggests that a lame-duck
session will do any more than attempt to resolve the
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revenue-neutral reduction of the corporate rate to
28 percent will benefit domestic entities and harm
many multinationals.
3. Domestic manufacturers versus other domestic
corporations. Again the question will be which
preferences finance the rate reduction and whether
benefit of the rate reduction exceeds the tax cost of
the preference repeal. For example, manufacturers
will focus on the fate of the section 199 manufacturing deduction. Capital-intensive industries will
focus on the implication of potential alterations of
the capital cost recovery system. Similarly, researchheavy companies will pay attention to the fate of
the R&E credit. Those with LIFO inventory will
worry about the consequences of repeal. Again, the
preferences selected to finance the rate reduction
will affect companies differently.
4. Passthrough entities versus C corporations. Perhaps the most difficult issue is to ensure that the
changes do not unduly affect the tax burden of the
passthrough sector. As previously discussed, that is
a serious structural, administrative, and political
issue, which has no good practical solution short of
integration. The existence of the problem has the
potential to pit the owners of passthrough entities
against the corporate community.
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The revenue neutrality threshold and the
revenue-estimating process are also a source of
confusion and contention. The JCT provides the
revenue estimates that bind Congress. An estimate
is determined by assessing the revenue consequences of any change in the tax law in comparison
to current law. The method involves a static estimate of the revenue change as well as an adjustment to take into account anticipated taxpayer
behavior.73 The macroeconomic effects on the
economy and the potential revenue consequences
of those effects are not taken into account. The latter
is often referred to as dynamic revenue scoring.
Dynamic revenue scoring has been a hot debating point for many years.74 While most tax law
changes are too insignificant to affect the macroeconomy, major changes might not be. For example,
some assert that the positive economic effects of a
major income tax rate reduction will produce economic growth (and consequent tax revenue) sufficient to offset the static tax loss of the rate reduction.
That assertion is nonsense. While tax changes can
stimulate the economy, the most aggressive estimates have found that no more than a fraction of
the tax loss will be recaptured through growth over
the long term.75
There is no question that an estimate would be
more accurate if the macroeconomic effects were
taken into account. The principal reason that is not
done is a lack of agreement on the method to apply
to yield the precise numbers that are required by the
Budget Act.76 However, the JCT occasionally dis-
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cusses the anticipated macroeconomic effect of tax
law changes by indicating a range of possible
outcomes.77
B. Executive Leadership
Many have commented that the goal of tax
reform should be to replicate the results of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, in which the individual and
corporate tax rates were reduced, there was no rate
difference between capital and wage income, and
the corporate tax base was broadened. That goal is
laudable, but this is not 1986 — it is more like 1984.
TRA 1986 was preceded by two comprehensive
Treasury studies.78 Extensive hearings were held.
The effort was led by President Reagan; Sens. Dole,
Packwood, and Bradley; and Ways and Means
Committee Chair Dan Rostenkowski.
Except for a series of hearings, nothing comparable has happened today. There have been no
detailed Treasury studies or proposals. The president has not made any significant commitment to
tax reform. Congress is fractured. There is no easy
available revenue source.
History informs that major tax changes cannot
occur without executive branch leadership. Even
then the task is difficult; without it, the effort is
unlikely to get off the ground.
C. Timing of Congressional Consideration
Legislation to avoid the fiscal cliff is not likely to
be enacted before the election — although there will
be plenty of posturing and empty threats. And all
the oxygen of the lame-duck session will be spent
avoiding going over that cliff. That is when Congress will have to address the expiration of the Bush
tax cuts, the other expiring provisions, the sequestration mandated by the Budget Control Act, and
possibly a debt ceiling increase. There will not be
time to address the business tax.
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impending expiration of the Bush tax cuts or the tax
provisions that expired at the end of 2011.

